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Beyond Lobbying Expenditures:
How Lobbying Breadth and Political Connectedness
Affect Firm Outcomes

Abstract
The extant lobbying literature largely focuses on the effects of firm aggregate lobbying
expenditures, suggesting that more lobbying expenditures fuel positive firm benefits. We argue
the focus on aggregate expenditures overlooks how expenditures are targeted and the influence
of those targeting the expenditures; as such, exploring such factors will both add insight to our
understanding of the theoretical mechanisms underlying lobbying and clarify contradictory
findings. Specifically, we argue a successful lobbying strategy consists of both the breadth of
government targeted and the political connectedness of the firm. Empirical results support our
contentions that lobbying breadth and political connectedness affect the benefits firms receive
from lobbying, which we operationalize both using government contracts and firm economic
performance. Our analyses imply that more is not always better in the case of lobbying breadth,
as the benefits accrued via dispersing lobbying across more governmental entities reaches a point
of diminishing returns when lobbying breadth reaches high levels. Further, political
connectedness has a moderating effect on the outcomes of lobbying breadth. We conclude the
article with a discussion of the theoretical and practical relevance of this research and offer
avenues forward for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
A growing body of empirical research supports the idea that firms’ engagement in lobbying,
defined as expending resources in an attempt to sway government officials to make decisions
beneficial to the lobbying firm (Graziano, 2001), is a viable strategy for firms to generate
favorable outcomes (cf. Kaiser, 2010; Shaffer, 1995). For example, estimates suggest that
Boeing secured $7,250 in tax breaks for every $1 spent lobbying (Hallman, 2014) and that from
1999 to 2005, Lockheed Martin’s $55 million in lobbying expenditures generated approximately
$90 billion in government contracts – or a 163,536 percent return on lobbying investment
(Miller, 2006). Given financial returns as large as those in the Boeing and Lockheed Martin
estimates (particularly in light of historical return on investment figures that averages between 10
to 15 percent), it is perhaps not surprising that lobbying is both ubiquitous across the globe (cf.
Choi, Jia, & Lu, 2014; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004) and a topic that generates a wealth of
attention from journalists, practitioners, and researchers alike. (For recent summaries, see
Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, 2009; Godwin, Ainsworth, & Godwin, 2013.)
Although extant research has begun to generate knowledge about the implications of firm
lobbying on organizational outcomes, such work focuses predominantly on how raw amounts of
monetary resources expended by firms provide benefits in the form of firm performance. 1 Yet,
evidence from this research is conflictive. For instance, while several studies find positive
performance associated with lobbying expenditures (e.g., Alexander, Mazza, & Scholz, 2009;
Chen, Parsley, & Yang, 2010; de Figueriredo & Silverman, 2006; Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, & Ness,

1
Lux, Crook, and Woehr’s (2011) meta-analyses found only one outcome associated with firm benefits from
lobbying that had more than one study, firm performance, measured with accounting-based measures such as return
on assets or return on investment, although there are notable exceptions in single-industry studies such as rate
increases (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005), ear marks (de Figueirdeo & Silverman, 2006) and import tariffs
(Schuler, 1996). The focus on firm performance is likely partially data driven, an issue we expand upon later in the
manuscript.

2013), other research demonstrates the relationship to be either negative (Hadani & Schuler,
2013; Igan, Mishra, & Tressel, 2011) or not related statistically (Hersch, Netter, & Pope, 2008;
Lenway, Jacobson, & Goldstein, 1990). The narrow focus of such work – which may be at least
in part due to data constraints – along with inconsistent results relating lobbying expenditures to
firm benefits “begs the question whether the current state of [lobbying] taxonomies is sufficient,”
as Hillman and colleagues note (2004: 845). That is, while the literature’s near exclusive focus
on aggregate expenditures reflects the expectation that expending resources on lobbying may net
benefits for firms, the conflicting findings suggests a need to both better develop our
understanding of the lobbying-firm benefit relationship and, more specifically, to search for and
capture the precise mechanisms underlying how firms net benefits from lobbying.
To address these issues, we focus on two mechanisms that we argue help to better capture the
manner in which firms are able to enjoy benefits from their lobbying efforts: the manner in
which lobbying expenditures are allocated amongst possible alternatives and connections firms
have with politicians. We expect both factors are not only individually important facets of
lobbying strategy but also interact in determining the outcomes firms receive from their lobbying
efforts. Specifically, we develop both a theoretical framework that conceptualizes firm lobbying
strategy as consisting of lobbying breadth and political connectedness as well as a novel
measurement for each aspect of lobbying strategy. We argue that the extent of government
activities or entities the firm is attempting to influence via lobbying, which we refer to as
lobbying breadth, will capture heterogeneity in firms’ lobbying expenditure allocation strategies
that affects the benefits a firm receives. Moreover, we build upon prior research on firms’
connections in political circles to develop theory about how relationships with government
officials, which we refer to as political connectedness, will play a role in determining the

corresponding benefits firms receive. From a theoretical perspective, we draw on the literatures on
resource allocation (e.g., Arrfelt, Wiseman, McNamara, & Hult, 2015; Klingebiel & Adner, 2015;
Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014) and political connections (e.g., Hillman, 2005; Hillman, Zardkoohi, &
Bierman, 1999; Vidal, Draca, & Fons-Rosen, 2012) to suggest ways in which lobbying breadth and
political connectedness will impact the effectiveness of a firm’s lobbying strategy.
Further, to gain a more nuanced understanding of the impact of lobbying, we focus on two
specific outcomes: government contracts and firm performance. While prior arguments indicate
that firms may benefit from lobbying and political connections in various ways, many of which
are difficult to directly observe, empirical research has typically measured benefits in the form of
firm performance (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Kim, 2008; Lux et al., 2011). Using government
contract value as an outcome in our study has two important advantages. One is that using
contracts allows us to analyze a benefit that is directly observable across a wide swath of
industries. As a result, we gain a richer picture of how direct government benefits are elicited
through lobbying within a generalizable sample. Another advantage of using contracts is that it
answers calls to expand studies to benefits other than firm performance (Kim, 2008; Lux et al.,
2011). As such, we are able to add new theoretical arguments to the lobbying literature while
also expanding the outcomes to aspects besides firm performance. Moreover, by also focusing on
firm performance, we develop arguments about how less directly observable benefits may also
advantage firms in the form of performance while remaining consistent with extant literature (cf.
Lux et al., 2011). Doing so enhances the comparability of our study with previous research.
Our study advances understanding in multiple ways. Most fundamentally, we provide a finer
grained understanding of the complex manner through which lobbying influences firm outcomes.
Specifically, by extending firms’ lobbying strategies beyond expenditures of resources, our study

not only better explicates what drives effective lobbying for firms, but also begins to clarify the
mixed findings of the relationship between lobbying and firm-level outcomes. Within this
general framework, we also make distinct contributions to research on resource allocation and
political connections. For research on resource allocation, our study speaks to certain limits in
the advantages that firms can gain from lobbying. Specifically, we show that allocating lobbying
resources to levels of intended targets reaches a point of diminishing marginal returns. For
research on political connections, our study speaks to how the myriad of possible connections
with government officials can affect the success of a firm’s lobbying strategy. Specifically, we
argue and find that the totality of a firm’s political connections is positively related to firm
outcomes and that it impacts the relationship between lobbying breadth and firm outcomes.
Relatedly, not only do we introduce lobbying breadth and political connectedness as critical
mechanisms for determining the payoffs firms enjoy from their lobbying efforts, but we build
upon extant research to develop measures that enable testing these mechanisms, offering an
empirical contribution which may serve as a basis for future research. Finally, we contribute to
the political strategy literature by levering our measures to test our theoretical framework across
both overtly visible government benefits to firms (i.e., government contracts) and a more
generalized benefit (i.e., firm performance) through a sample of firms across multiple industries.
LITERATURE REVIEW
As Hillman et al. (1999: 67) note, “even the best competitive strategies accompanied by
superior products and unique firm resources will not survive without attention to the
government” (Carroll & Hall, 1987). Whether it takes the form of securing (and maintaining)
government contracts (Blumentritt, 2003), applying for and securing permits (Nownes, 2006),
maintaining and building connections with public officials (Clawson, Neustadtl, & Weller, 1998;

Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009), or complying with laws and/or regulations (Peltzman, 1976;
Stigler, 1971), such attention can burden firms with substantial costs. In fact, estimates suggest
that federal regulations in the United States (U.S.) cost firms $2.028 trillion in 2012 alone (Crain
& Crain, 2014). Given this large scale of government influence, it is of little surprise that firms
invest resources to sway government entities to act in their favor (Baysinger, 1984)
Corporate political activity (CPA) scholars argue that engaging in CPA provides firms with
benefits that are directly visible, such as securing government contracts (Blumentritt, 2003; Hart,
2001), as well as benefits like minimized tax and regulatory burdens, which are not as directly
identifiable but still benefit firms’ performance (e.g., Chen et al., 2010; Hillman et al., 1999).
Most empirical studies of how CPA benefits firms focus on benefits that translate to better firm
performance, typically conceptualized using accounting-based measures (Kim, 2008; Lux et al.,
2011). Scholars justify this approach for two related reasons. One is that some direct benefits to
firms, such as influencing regulation and legislative effects on the firm, are often difficult to
observe. For example, Hall and Wayman (1990) note that politicians may not want to engage in
directly visible actions because the actions may indicate that the politician is being influenced by
the interests of business. Instead, the authors argue, politicians use various maneuvers that avoid
direct detection but that nonetheless return benefits for firms. Another is that even if direct
benefits to firms are visible, large-scale data on the benefits has not traditionally been available,
limiting scholars’ ability to analyze CPA benefits on a broader level. Thus, despite few
exceptions studying single pieces of legislation (cf. Alexander et al., 2009; Duchin & Sosyura,
2012), extant research generally investigates how CPA relates to firm performance.
Firms derive benefits from CPA in two primary ways: lobbying and campaign contributions
(Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011; Tahoun, 2014), each of which sway government action in

distinct manners. Lobbying involves communicating information for the purpose of influencing
actions (Chen et al., 2010; Nownes, 2006), while campaign contributions can establish a quid pro
quo relationship where a firm helps improve electoral prospects of candidates in return for the
candidate acting in the firm’s interest (e.g., Kroszner & Stratmann, 2000; Milyo, Primo, &
Groseclose, 2000; Tahoun, 2014). Indeed, some argue that campaign contributions “may be
thought of as entry fees that enable corporations to utilize other forms of CPA” (Hillman et al.,
2004: 848), such that donations create relationships allowing firms a ‘foot in the door’ to lobby.
Of the two means of CPA, lobbying not only dominates the expenditures by firms (Hill et al.,
2013; Milyo et al., 2000), but evidence also suggests that lobbying is the primary (Kaiser, 2010;
Lux et al., 2011) and most effective (Coen, 1997; Lord, 2000) means by which firms influence
government officials. The differential use of lobbying by firms and the disparate influence that
lobbying has on the benefits firms receive perhaps occurs because campaign contributions are
limited in scope whereas lobbying is not. That is, it is not possible to contribute to campaigns of
the multitude of appointed officials who do not hold elected office and thus cannot accept
contributions from firms. Doing so would constitute a bribe (Tahoun, 2014). In contrast, there
are no corresponding restrictions on utilizing information for the purpose of influence as occurs
in lobbying, and thus lobbying may be expended to influence more government officials.
Similarly, many countries limit or ban campaign contributions, but lobbying faces fewer
restrictions (Djankov, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2009). Given possible scope
differences, lobbying may be both more utilized and more effective because firms can attempt to
sway all government officials. With campaign contributions, firms can only target those
government officials who are seeking (re)election and are only able to reach a fraction of total
government officials. As lobbying is a primary political tool at the disposal of a firm to sway

government officials to act in ways that are beneficial to the firm, the topic generates interest
from various parties such as journalists, academics, and practitioners and in both the public and
private sectors (e.g., Baumgartner et al., 2009; Godwin et al., 2013).
Historically, scholars, practitioners, and even leaders of state expressed concerns over the
ubiquitous role lobbying plays in influencing government officials (Mack, 1989; Silberfeld,
2006). Concerns over lobbying’s influence on government officials may be bolstered by a body
of empirical research supporting the idea that firms’ lobbying can sway government officials to
act in ways that benefit lobbying firms (Kaiser, 2010; Shaffer, 1995). For example, Wright
(1990: 417) finds that politician voting was “best explained” by lobbying while the amount spent
on lobbying has also been linked to higher equity returns, new income, and market share (Kim,
2008; Shaffer, Quasney, & Grimm, 2000). While a body of research supports the contention that
expending resources on lobbying has positive implications for firms, extant work largely focuses
on the effect of aggregate expenditures toward lobbying on firm performance. Further, some
studies suggest that firms do not actually benefit from lobbying. As a case in point, in studies of
how lobbying expenditures return benefits to firms in the form of performance, some studies find
that the relationship is either negative (e.g., Coates & John, 2010; Igan et al., 2011) or not
statistically related (e.g., Hersch, Netter, & Pope, 2008; Lenway, Jacobson, & Goldstein, 1990;
Lenway & Rehbein, 1991). Some authors attribute the opposite findings to lobbying firms being
overly risky or that lobbying may represent a poor quality investment (cf. Hadani & Schuler,
2013), but these arguments do not directly focus on the allocation of lobbying resources.
We suggest that expanding current understanding of lobbying beyond aggregate expenditures
may help to clarify incongruent findings about lobbying and benefits firms receive. Particularly,
we argue it is important to investigate how firms allocate expenditures and lever relationships

with government officials. For example, investing $10 million to lobby a single government
official, bill, or agency may return different outcomes than dispersing the same $10 million
lobbying investment across a breadth of officials, bills, or entities. Similarly, the benefits that
accrue to a firm based upon that $10 million expenditure may differ based upon the ability of the
lobbying firm to exert influence in government spheres. Moreover, prior research suggests that
greater levels of government connections should imply greater influence and ability to persuade
government action that is favorable to the firm (Goldman et al., 2009; Goldman, Rocholl, & So,
2013; Hillman, 2005; Nownes, 2006; Vidal et al., 2012). Thus, we propose these two distinct
dimensions of lobbying – lobbying breadth and political connectedness – to address both how the
firm allocates lobbying expenditures and the ability of the firm to influence government officials.
Further, we build upon the observation that lobbying can return both more directly visible
outcomes as well as less directly visible benefits that nonetheless result in improved performance
(Nownes, 2006; Richter, Samphantharak, & Timmons, 2009). We do so by addressing how
lobbying breadth and political connectedness relate to both a directly visible benefit (firm
government contract value) and a benefit that may result from other less directly visible actions
(firm performance). We choose to focus on contracting for both practical and theoretical reasons.
On a practical level, not only is data on this form of benefit publicly available and not ambiguous
in its value (as opposed to regulatory and legislative outcomes), but also government purchases
account for a great portion of the business for many firms (Hillman et al., 1999). On a theoretical
level, contracts are perhaps the only outcome of lobbying directly visible across industries over
time and not obscured by other government processes (Stigler, 1971). Thus, we develop
theoretical arguments relating lobbying breadth and political connectedness to both contracts and
firm performance. At the same time, by also focusing on how lobbying breadth and political

connectedness affect firm performance, we are able to both capture how less directly observable
benefits nonetheless benefit firms’ “bottom line” while also tying closely to the extant literature,
which focuses predominantly on firm performance as a lobbying outcome (cf. Lux et al., 2011).
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Lobbying Breadth
Expending resources on lobbying may attempt to influence government action in multiple
branches of government (e.g., executive, legislative, and judicial in the U.S.), spanning vast
layers of employees (both elected and nonelected), and shaping specific policy initiatives
(Godwin et al., 2013). Because of the sheer size of government, firms may target lobbying
efforts towards influencing any number of agencies or legislative actions. To illustrate the
breadth of possible lobbying targets, consider that in 2013, the U.S. federal government
employed over 2.7 million people (Willhide, 2014) in 438 distinct agencies
(www.federalregister.gov) while in the 113th U.S. Congress, 15,926 total legislative acts were
initiated: 8,913 specific bills, 5,281 amendments, and 1,732 resolutions (www.congress.gov).
Due to the immense number of possible targets, just as with decisions to allocate resources
among possible new products (Klingebiel & Adner, 2015; Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014),
business units (Makadok, 2001; Arrfelt et al., 2015), and human resources (Sirmon, Gove, &
Hitt, 2008) or across a broader search pattern (Leiponen & Helfat, 2010), firms must decide
among myriad lobbying possibilities. We argue the extent of government activities or entities
firms attempt to influence via lobbying, which we refer to as lobbying breadth, is an important
factor in determining benefits firms accrue from lobbying efforts. As an example of the possible
breadth of firm lobbying activities, in 2008, Centerpoint Energy elected to lobby a single
legislative act and Schlumberger LTD lobbied only one federal agency, suggesting a narrow

lobbying breadth; alternatively, in the same year, Principal Financial Group lobbied 365 separate
legislative acts and IBM lobbied 43 distinct federal agencies, suggesting larger lobbying breadth.
Resource allocation amongst potential options has long been viewed as an important
predictor of firm-level outcomes (cf. Penrose, 1959; Williamson, 1975). Indeed, as Arrfelt and
colleagues (2013: 1083) note, “allocating scarce resources to competing strategic investment
opportunities may be one of the most critical choices managers make and a major determinant of
firm performance.” In support of this view, a wealth of research has examined the effects of
resource allocation amongst potential options such as in acquisitions (Agarwal, Anand, Bercovitz
& Croson, 2012) and alliances (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohrial, 1998) as well as amongst industries
(Maksimovic & Phillips, 2002) and divisions (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000). The premise
behind resource allocation arguments is that since the returns associated with any single resource
allocation are uncertain, firms benefit from increasing resource allocation breadth because
“spreading bets” across a range of possibilities may increase the probability of at least some
success – or, simply put, firms should not put ‘all their eggs in one basket’ and instead ‘expand
their portfolio’ (Haspelagh, 1982) and spread allocations amongst a breadth of possibilities (e.g.,
new product introductions; Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014; projects; Stein, 1997).
Like contexts in previous resource allocation research in which returns are not certain, (e.g.,
new product introductions; projects; business units) returns to lobbying any single piece of
legislation or agency are highly uncertain. In fact, even lobbyists disagree as to what increases
the odds of securing positive outcomes (Nownes, 2006). Thus, as a part of a lobbying strategy,
firms may improve the probability of securing positive outcomes by increasing the breadth of the
government entities toward which lobbying resources are allocated. Through greater lobbying
breadth, the uncertainty of success on any single target may remain high, but the number of

possible targets for persuasion also increases, thus improving the probability that some lobbying
tactics are successful. Therefore, as a firm increases its lobbying breadth and in so doing
attempts to influence more aspects of government, the prospect of firms receiving positive
outcomes increases (cf., Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014; Stein, 1997).
To understand how lobbying breadth benefits a firm’s ability to secure greater value in
government contracts, the contracting process must be considered. Generally, the process
involves both the appropriation of funds for purchasing a good/service as well as the awarding of
the contract (Nownes, 2006). Firms lobby in order to influence both aspects of the contracting
process: the former increases the value of possible contracts while the latter increases the odds of
securing a contract, making the two aspects of lobbying inextricably linked. Through increased
lobbying breadth, firms allocate resources across numerous agencies and pieces of legislation.
Thus as those resources are spread, firms are able to: 1) have a broader target base in which to
generate demand for their goods/services, 2) increase the number of officials they may persuade
to request funding for the firm’s goods/services, and 3) increase the number of officials who may
be persuaded to award the contract or influence the contract awarding process. (For a detailed
review of how lobbying affects the contracting process, see Nownes, 2006.) As such, greater
lobbying breadth can aid in increasing the value of possible contracts available for the firms’
goods/services in addition to improving the probability of securing available contracts. For
example, in 2006 Coca-Cola and PepsiCo expended similar dollar amounts toward lobbying
efforts ($1.06 million and $880,000, respectively); however, Coca-Cola lobbied 10 agencies and
14 legislative acts while PepsiCo lobbied 18 agencies and 25 legislative acts. In this example,
PepsiCo opted for greater lobbying breadth and in so doing had contracts from more departments
within the government and with a total value of $244.4 million to Coca-Cola’s $59.3 million.

While we suggest that as with product innovation (Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014) greater
breadth of resource allocation across government improves outcomes obtained through lobbying
(and specifically contracts), there are two reasons this positive relationship will likely not
continue indefinitely, but instead will reach a point of diminishing returns. First, when choosing
to expand the breadth of lobbying, it is possible that as breadth reaches very high levels, the
agencies or legislation targeted can only affect the firm tangentially and/or may have a limited
number of contracts to award or limited ability to appropriate funds. Therefore, while expanding
lobbying breadth to influence a greater number of agencies or legislation, some of them will
likely have lower and lower probable impact on the firm. Consider the prior example. PepsiCo
lobbied 25 legislative acts, many of which are easily identifiable as possibly impacting a firm in
the food and beverage industry (e.g., Childhood Obesity Reduction Act, Healthy Lifestyles and
Prevention America Act) while others are less obvious as direct impacts on a firm in that
industry (e.g., Voting Rights Act, Haiti Infrastructure Reconstruction Act). Although bills with
seemingly less obvious impact on PepsiCo likely have some importance to the firm, or resources
would not have been expended toward lobbying them, it seems likely that they are more
tangential. Lobbying the more tangential legislation may have a positive impact, yet likely
provides fewer benefits than more directly impactful legislation. For instance, Klingebiel and
Rammer (2014) find that firms engaging in greater breadth of resource allocation towards
product innovation and that were also selective with what projects to continue to pursue had
greater performance returns. This finding suggests that while spreading allocations across a
greater breadth of products is beneficial, some degree of selectivity of breadth of products in
which to invest is optimal. Lobbying should work similarly – while having a greater breadth of

lobbying likely returns greater benefits, at a certain point the possible targets will result in
diminishing returns for the corresponding increase in breadth.
Second, as lobbying breadth increases, each new government target requires shifting
influence tactics from one target to another. This shift limits the resources (capital, time,
lobbyists) that can be directed toward any single target. With the growing spreading of resources,
firms are not able to give intense focus to any single target but rather have lower levels of focus
across more targets. For example, research shows that resource allocation breadth can limit focus
and thrust while removing sufficient resources for the task at hand (Klingebiel & Rammer,
2014). Therefore, all else constant, in the context of lobbying, we expect that as the breadth of
lobbying targets increases to very high levels, a smaller amount of emphasis may be placed on
any single entity because resources are allocated across a larger number of entities. In such a
strategy, the firm’s lobbying is widely spread among multiple areas and possible decisions
throughout the vast government bureaucracy, diminishing the impact of lobbying as breadth
increases. Based on the above, we expect that lobbying breadth will have a positive impact on
the amount of government contracts a firm secures. However, we expect that this positive
relationship will diminish as lobbying breadth reaches very high levels.
Hypothesis 1: Lobbying breadth will have a diminishingly positive association with
firm government contract value; the relationship is most positive at lower levels of
lobbying breadth but weakens at high levels of lobbying breadth.
Beyond benefiting firms through higher-value government contracts, lobbying also benefits
firms in ways that might not be as overtly visible but nonetheless affect firms’ performance, such
as creating favorable regulatory environments and securing tax benefits (Stigler, 1971). As
Nownes (2006: 37) suggests, it is often hard to identify any single beneficial outcome for a firm

outside of procurement lobbying to generate contracts because “the range of public policy issues
with which governments deal is exceptionally broad” and quite nuanced. Thus, many actions not
directly visible – such as stalling or altering legislation, impacting regulatory burdens, or
obtaining more favorable tax schemes – will in totality benefit firms and are likely to be visible
only in the firm’s performance.
Generally, the same arguments relating lobbying breadth to contracts hold with benefits that
accrue in the form of firm performance, although generalized to broader aspects of government
such as regulation, taxation, and legislation. Through a broad lobbying strategy, the allocation of
resources across a greater number of government officials, improving the firm’s ability to secure
outcomes that are generally beneficial, such as favorable regulation or e pushing (stalling)
regulations and laws that may help (harm) the firm. Therefore, we expect that due to the ability
to influence greater levels of government entities, lobbying breadth will have a positive effect on
firm performance. Yet, similar to prior arguments relating lobbying breadth to government
contracts, the positive relationship with firm performance will have diminishing returns due to
tangential targeting and diminishing influence at very high levels.
Hypothesis 2: Lobbying breadth will have a diminishingly positive association with
firm performance; the relationship is most positive at lower levels of lobbying
breadth but weakens at high levels of lobbying breadth.
Political Connectedness
While lobbying breadth focuses on the allocation among government entities targeted, we
must also consider the access and influence that the firm has with government officials in those
targeted entities. Scholars note that influencing government actions “is all about connections”
(Vidal et al., 2012: 3731) to such an extent that having relationships with government officials

“has become more than a part of legislative politics – for many, it is legislative politics” (Levine,
2009: 199, emphasis in original). Consistent with the notion that relationships with government
officials are important, scholars argue that firms with greater political connections are better able
to influence the government contracting and regulatory process in a manner more favorable to
the firm (Goldman et al., 2013; Hillman, 2005; Hillman et al., 1999; Nownes, 2006). These
connections generally provide access to powerbrokers that is not available to those without such
connections. We build upon the concept that firms can lever political connections to their benefit
to argue that the number of relationships with government officials will relate to the benefits the
firm receives. Specifically, we posit that the ability to obtain access and influence in lobbying
efforts, which we refer to as political connectedness, will generate positive outcomes for firms.
Extant research identifies three relationships that provide firms with greater political
connectedness. First, firms are connected to government officials via political service – where a
firm employs current or former government officials who collectively offer both experience and
a network of contacts that can be levered for the benefit of their employing firm (cf. Faccio,
2006; Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; Hillman et al., 1999). Demonstrating the value of
political service to firms, Lester and colleagues (2008) note an almost 400 percent rise in the
number of public firms with government officials serving on their boards over the quartercentury from 1973 to 1998, despite the average size of boards declining by 44 percent over the
same period. Moreover, a multitude of prior research shows the benefit of prior government
service of board members (Goldman et al., 2013; Hillman, 2005; Hillman et al., 1999).
Second, firms also improve connectedness through donations to electoral campaigns (Keim
& Zeithaml, 1986). Firm donations to election campaigns are argued to create quid pro quo
relationships such that firms provide resources to help elected officials secure office while the

elected officials provide benefits in return (Kroszner & Stratmann, 1998; Snyder, 1990; Tahoun,
2014; Tripathi, 2000) or, more simply, to buy access and influence (Nownes, 2006; Tahoun,
2014). Indeed, Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2014: 452) find that firms use donations to officials
prior to regulatory review because doing so will “gain explicit or implicit political support.”
Third, firms create connections through the employment of former government officials as
lobbyists (e.g., Hillman, 2005; Kim, 2008; Vidal et al., 2012). Prior government officials who
become lobbyists are thought to have greater access to government information and officials than
those without such experience (Levine, 2009; Rosenthal, 2001; Santos, 2006). In fact, a former
congressperson, speaking about acting on information obtained from lobbyists, stated “I would
do this with a lobbyists that I knew well – mostly ex-staff people I had known” (Levine, 2009:
199). Similarly, Tony Podesta, founder of one of the most prominent lobbying firms, reiterated
“people who are experienced in Washington tend to be better at doing this kind of work than
people who have never worked in the government before” (Farnam, 2011).
Collectively, as Agrawal and Knoeber (2000: 180) note, connections to government officials
“aid the firm with the knowledge of government procedures and their insight in predicting
government actions.” More important, such connections are valuable in that “most directly, they
may also act to enlist government in the firm’s interest or to forestall government actions
inimical to the firm.” Consistent with the idea that greater connectedness provide firms with
preferential access to, and influence with, government officials, we argue that, collectively these
aspects constitute a firm’s overall political connectedness, offering firms a number of benefits.
First, political connections provide firms with greater access to, and influence with,
government officials with whom they are connected (cf. Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014;
Nownes, 2006; Tahoun, 2014). Indeed, “prior experience in government allows former officials

to develop a network of friends and colleagues that they can later exploit” (Vidal et al., 2012:
3731). The access and influence that more political connectedness provides should result in
higher levels of benefits received by the firm as more government officials act in ways that
benefit the firms in which they are connected. Similarly, by having relationships with
government officials, firms are able to gather information and react proactively to possible
government initiatives (Nownes, 2006). That is, greater levels of political connections increase
the amount and quality of government information that is accessed, thus providing insight into
how a firm should respond. For instance, John Breaux, a former U.S. Senator, is now a lobbyist
employed by hedge funds “to provide instant tips on the progress of potentially market-moving
legislation, from the settlement of asbestos lawsuits to allowing oil drilling in an Alaskan refuge.
It’s a legal way of letting investors benefit from information gleaned from private conversations
with lawmakers and aides” (Jensen, Forsythe, & Salant, 2005).
Second, while political connectedness may provide influence via relationships with
government officials, these relationships will also lend other selective benefits to the firm such as
legitimacy, status, and goodwill (Hillman et al., 1999). Current and former government
employees’ prior positions distinguish these individuals from those who do not possess that
experience, and as such will accrue advantages from their government experience (Bowers,
Greve, Mitsuhasi & Baum, 2014). Indeed, prior government officials employed by firms have a
greater level of credibility because of their expertise in both policy and the legislative process
(cf. Esterling, 2009; Mattozzi & Merlo, 2008). This expertise “can refer to policy matters, the
inner workings of the legislative process, or even the preferences of particular constituencies”
(Vidal et al., 2012: 3732). Consequently, firms with greater political connectedness are likely to

be viewed more favorably by government officials; thus when weighing decisions, greater
political connections will create greater benefits for the firm.
At a more specific level, when considering government contracts, the value of contracts
accessible to firms is quite large. Even a fraction of a percent of government contracts can be
substantial to a firm. For instance, Lockheed Martin is typically one of the largest government
contractors, yet in 2014 the company’s $13.5 billion contract obligation was only 3 percent of
the total $445.5 billion government contracting value available. As a firm has more political
connectedness, the access, influence, and leverage provided by these relationships improves the
ability to convince government decision makers to intercede on the behalf of the firm when
making purchase decisions. Every procurement lobbyist Nownes (2006) interviewed in his study
on lobbying effectiveness stated that prior relationships were essential to winning government
contracts, not only because government officials like to award contracts to people they know but
also because connectedness grants access to those individuals who award contracts.
Similarly, having more connections provides valuable information that a firm can use to be
proactive on bidding for contracts, such as knowledge of price parameters and product or service
requirements that should net contracts vis-à-vis less-connected firms. Assuredly, relationships
with government officials “can provide some government contractors with unfair advantages
over their competitors, due to insider knowledge that can be used to the benefit of the contractor”
(Revolving Door Working Group, 2005: 8). In sum, relationships with government officials
generate favors in the form of officials being more likely to patronize the firm as well as in
obtaining information the firm can use to better secure contracts. Thus, as a firm has greater
political connectedness, it is likely to increase the value of its government contracts.

Hypothesis 3. Political connectedness will have a positive relationship with firm
government contract values.
As Hillman and colleagues note (1999: 71), “theoretically, all of the benefits” associated with
firms’ connections to government officials should benefit firms in ways not overtly visible, such
as government contracts, but are nonetheless beneficial such that connectedness “should affect
firm performance.” For example, scholars note benefits afforded firms with political connections
during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations that benefitted their performance (e.g.,
Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman et al., 1999; Nownes, 2006). Therefore, it is likely that political
connectedness will be positively associated with firm performance for similar reasons as with
government contracts. Specifically, the greater the political connectedness, the more likely the
firm will gain benefits in ways that translate to economically beneficial outcomes for firms.
Hypothesis 4. Political connectedness will have a positive relationship with firm
performance.
The Intersection of Lobbying Breadth and Political Connectedness
We expect that political connectedness provides firms with benefits such as access, trust,
status, and legitimacy that can be levered to generate firm-level benefits (cf. Faccio et al., 2006;
Fisman, 2001; Hillman, 2005), as previously argued. However, we also expect connectedness to
generate more certainty of success at lower levels of lobbying breadth since more connections
create greater access and influence and to some degree limits the uncertainty in the lobbying
process. Thus political connectedness initially creates positive outcomes at lower levels of
lobbying breadth, yet it is also likely that the benefits accrued from having greater political
connectedness will lose prevalence as lobbying breadth increases because of two interrelated
mechanisms: the exploitive nature of levering connectedness and associated opportunity costs.

With respect to the exploitative nature of levering connectedness, scholars note that
politically connected representatives of firms are most effective when being opportunistic in
exploiting their relationships in political arenas such that moving from one topic area to another
is common if the government officials with whom a relationship exists change positions
(Bertrand, Bombardini, & Trebbi, 2011; Vidal et al., 2012). That is, rather than attempting to
influence government officials with whom they have only a passing relationship, politically
connected individuals tend to both exploit those relationships in which they have most influence,
to the exclusion of others, and are more effective at doing so. As such, political connections are
most beneficial when concentrated on a limited number of relationships that can be exploited.
Yet as a firm’s lobbying breadth increases, the firm is targeting more entities and issues,
spreading firm representatives across more aspects of government where connections may not be
possessed and influence is minimal, thereby limiting the typical exploitive nature of lobbying.
When aggregated to the firm level, because political connections typically function within a
narrow set of government contacts whom they can sway, the likelihood that the firm will have
political connections great enough to reap benefits diminishes as a firm targets more entities.
Thus, as lobbying breadth increases, there is a decreasing likelihood that political connectedness
will return benefits. As such, the influence of greater lobbying connectedness on the relationship
between lobbying breadth and benefits the firm receives decreases as lobbying breadth increases.
Related to the exploitative nature of levering connectedness, there are opportunity costs for
individuals when spreading influence across greater levels of government because each
representative has limited time and capacity for action. Specifically, as the firm attempts to target
more entities, the firms’ representatives with political connections may not be able to effectively
influence each individual with whom a relationship exists. Their time and energy is spread thin

while at the same time also using such focus on influencing government officials in which prior
relationships were not as strong and less easy to lever. The net result of spreading both allocated
time and capacity away from relationships that are most fruitful (thus decreasing the likelihood
of returning benefits) as well as allocating time and energy to relationships that are less likely to
return benefits creates a dual opportunity cost: relationships that are most fruitful do not receive
adequate attention (thus, decreasing the likelihood of returning benefits) while time spent on
attempting to influence individuals where the politically connected individuals have less
influence diminishes the firm’s overall ability to achieve the desired outcome.
McFadyen and Cannella (2004) discuss a similar type of opportunity cost, finding that
knowledge creation is only benefited through relationships to an optimal point, beyond which
opportunity costs arise that negatively affect both knowledge creation and time an individual
may allocate to activities. This finding suggests that focusing on more activities or individuals
may hinder peoples’ ability to utilize their relational networks. Arguably, political connectedness
should function similarly – individuals’ ability to utilize their networks to influence government
officials is diminished as the individuals are asked to expand the number they must influence
because their focus is turned toward less fruitful relationships. Thus, as all politically connected
individuals are faced with similar constraints no matter the manner in which those connections
are established, we consider the aggregate impact of these constraints. Therefore, we expect that
while those firms with greater levels of political connectedness will have greater overall firm
outcomes than those with lower levels of political connectedness, as lobbying breadth increases,
the positive benefits reaped through political connectedness will be less positive.
Hypothesis 5. Political connectedness will moderate the diminishing positive relationship
between lobbying breadth and government contract values such that the curvilinear
relationship is weakened as political connectedness increases.

Hypothesis 6. Political connectedness will moderate the diminishing positive relationship
between lobbying breadth and firm performance such that the curvilinear relationship is
weakened as political connectedness increases.

METHODS
Sample
The sample consists of U.S. firms listed in the S&P 500 index in the year 2004. Data was
collected for these firms from 2004 to 2009 (data from 2003 was also collected to minimize
observations lost when using lagged instrumental variables). All data pertaining to firm lobbying
and other political activity was collected from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), a
research group that examines the effects of money and lobbying on elections, government
actions, and public policy. CRP provides data for all campaign contributions and lobbying
directed toward the federal government. Government contracting data was collected from
usaspending.gov, an official website of the U.S. federal government that documents federal
government contracts (Tahoun, 2014). Board member linkages between the government and firm
were collected from BoardEx. Finally, all other firm-level variables were collected from
Compustat. To establish temporal spacing, independent and control variables were collected in
the time period t, while dependent variables were collected in time period t + 1.
Measurement
Dependent variable. Government contracts was measured as the logarithm of the total value
of all contracts between the focal company and the U.S. federal government throughout the year.
Firm performance was measured as Tobin’s Q, calculated as market value of the firm divided by
total assets. We calculated market value as the value of the firm’s common stock, liquidating
value of preferred stock, book value of long-term debt, and firm debt with maturity of less than

one year (Kim & Bettis, 2014). Due to the primary focus of the CPA literature on accounting
based measures (Lux et al., 2011), the focus on a market based measure such as Tobin’s Q
provides for unique insight into the manner in which lobbying affects firm outcomes.
Independent variables. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 provided for additional
accountability and transparency in federal lobbying; individuals and firms engaged in lobbying
the federal government are required to report the lobbying efforts in which they engage,
including amount spent, agencies lobbied, specific issues on lobbied, and lobbyists involved.
Lobbying breadth focused on the number of government entities and issues in which a firm
attempted to influence. Thus, we used the number of legislative acts and the number of federal
agencies/entities directly targeted by lobbying activities on behalf of the firm over the course of a
year. To measure lobbying breadth, the number of entities and acts were standardized and
summed to give an aggregate measure of total breadth of the firms lobbying efforts.
Political connectedness is defined as the ability to access and influence government officials
through prior relationships. We constructed our measure of political connectedness through the
inclusion of connections in prior research: the number of revolving door lobbyists employed
(Vidal et al., 2012), the number of board members with prior government experience (Hillman,
2005), and the number of congressional campaigns to which the firm donated (Tahoun, 2014).
The measure of revolving door lobbyists includes individuals formerly employed in federal
government, including former members of Congress, Congressional staffs, White House staff, or
specific departments within the federal government (e.g, Departments of State, Treasury, Energy,
Commerce, Transportation, etc.). Using BoardEx employment history data, board member prior
experience was constructed as a count of all individuals on the board who have current or prior
employment listed as government. Examples of some of the individuals listed include those who

had previously been appointed to government positions such as district and circuit court judges,
regulatory agents, and the Cabinet as well as those elected to positions such as state and national
Representatives and Senators. Finally, we also include a count of the campaigns to which the
firm contributed in a given year regardless of number of donations such that multiple donations
to the same campaign are counted only once 2.
Similar to lobbying breadth, we standardized and summed each of these variables to create our
measure of political connectedness. Each measure was scaled by the number of operating segments
within which the firm operates to account for the dispersion of attention of connections. 3 Because
lobbying breadth and political connectedness effects may be obfuscated by long lead times of
government activity (cf. Hadani & Schuler, 2013), we calculated each variable of interest
cumulatively over the focal (time t) and prior (time t - 1) year as a robustness test.
Control variables. We controlled for overall corporate political investments by including the
amount of lobbying expenditures, PAC contributions, and contributions to 527 groups, which are
“a tax-exempt group organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code to raise money
for political activities” (Center for Responsive Politics). The measure of lobbying expenditures
was included as the natural logarithm of the total dollar amount expended by the firm on
lobbying activity. We included other types of firm political activity such as contributions to
political action committees (PACs) and 527 groups (measured as total expenditures in these
areas) because resources allocated to these activities may influence the outcomes in our study.
The variables are referred to as PAC contributions and contributions to 527 groups. To account
for skewness in each of these variables, both were calculated with the natural logarithm.
2

Because it may be argued that PAC contributions are a different type of resource allocation rather than the
development of connections, we separately created this variable excluding PAC contributions and only including
revolving door lobbyists and board member government experience. Results of this measurement are directly
comparable to those reported.
3
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

Beyond political expenditures, capital investment was included and measured as annual
capital equipment expenditures of the focal firm. Moreover, we also included measures of the
firm’s exposure and slack in the form of long-term debt and cash on hand and short-term
investments, termed financial slack, to account for the possible effects of such aspects on firm
performance and resources available for lobbying (George, 2005; Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss,
2008). We also included a measure of firm size, measured as the logarithm of total assets. Prior
ROE was included to account for accounting-based performance, and prior Tobin’s Q was also
included. 4 We also include the lagged value for contracts in the contracting models, however
because inclusion of lagged dependent variables in random effects causes the estimator to be
biased, we follow Kennedy’s (2008) guidance and include the prior years value as instrumented
by the contracting value in t-2 (cf. Anderson & Hsiao; 1981) 5.
We controlled for industry aspects that may impact lobbying necessity. Specifically, we
included a measure for Regulated industry taking on a value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly
regulated industry and a 0 otherwise (Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 2013; Hadani & Schuler, 2013).
Similarly, we also included the measure industry tax rate as the average marginal tax rate of the
firm’s industry measured at the two-digit SIC. Finally, we controlled for overall industry
lobbying. First, industry lobbying expenditures was measured as average lobbying expenditures
by each firm in the focal firm’s industry (focal firm lobbying was not included in this calculation
and the industry lobbying classification used was that created by the Center for Responsive
Politics). Second, we included industry lobbying attention, which is the number of client
organizations that lobbied that specific industry in each year. Finally, we included a control for
the number of lobbyists that lobby within each industry, called industry lobbyist intensity.
4

In alternative Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) models, we excluded the lagged dependent variable and
results remained consistent with those reported below.
5
Results are robust to exclusion of this control.

Selection Bias and a Censored Endogenous Variable
Firms that lobby may differ from firms that do not (Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994),
possibly creating selection bias. Moreover, the process of selecting into level of lobbying may
also lead to problems of endogeneity. As such, we followed recent work focusing on two-step
estimation of panel data models with possible selection bias and a censored endogenous variable
(Vella, 1998; Vella & Verbeek, 1999). Vella and Verbeek (1999) refer to this process as
conditional moment estimation, which provides initial consistent estimators so that
asymptotically efficient estimators can be obtained. They argue that in panel data models,
endogeneity and sample selection bias result from a failure to account for unobserved
heterogeneity in the primary equations and recommend the inclusion of estimates of this
heterogeneity from the reduced form residuals of two first-stage regressions to be included as
additional explanatory variables in second-stage analyses. This procedure provides several
notable benefits. First, it allows for exploiting the panel nature of the data to isolate the form of
heterogeneity driving endogeneity/selection bias. Second, it introduces dynamics into panel data
models involving forms of sample selection and/or censored endogenous regressors, allowing for
the isolation of the individual effects from state dependence (Vella & Verbeek, 1999). Finally,
this two-step procedure provides a test of selection bias with the correction terms similar to the
cross-sectional Heckman procedure. However, the major difference is that with this procedure
two covariances are estimated, one capturing the correlation between the individual effects and
the second capturing the covariance between idiosyncratic shocks that can be accounted for in
panel data (Vella, 1998; Vella & Verbeek, 1999).
To employ the correction discussed by Vella and Verbeek (1999) and Vella (1998), we
performed two separate random effects Tobit regressions predicting lobbying breadth in a first

stage. The first model assumed the underlying process of sample selection and endogeneity is
static. The second model allowed for the possibility of state dependence and thus included time
dummies (Vella, 1998). From these two specifications, we computed two correction terms to
includ as controls (Vella, 1998; Vella & Verbeek, 1999). The first, σμα , accounts for the static
process determining selection and endogeneity, while the second, σην , accounts for state
dependence. Important in this specification is that since the correction terms are estimated by
Tobit regression, the terms are accounting for the probability of participation in addition to the
breadth of lobbying activity (Vella, 1998; e.g., Vella & Verbeek, 1999). In determining our
strategy for inclusion of variables in these regressions, we consulted prior theory and research
(Angrist & Pischke, 2008). Since firms engage in lobbying to sway government officials to act in
ways that benefit the firm (including minimizing the intrusion of government into the industry in
which the firm competes), to shape government policy to be beneficial to the firm, or to assist in
shielding the company from current industry governmental policies that affect competition, often
in the forms of both regulation or income taxes. Therefore, we included a variable for the amount
of income taxes paid by the firm in the prior year, as large levels of income taxes provide an
impetus for greater attempts at shaping governmental tax policy. Moreover, research shows that
firms with higher firm-specific regulatory burdens have lower productivity and greater levels of
cost of goods sold suggesting that cost of goods sold is indicative of regulatory burdens. As such,
we included cost of goods sold as a regressor in our first-stage models (Carter, Kale, & Grimm,
2000; Gollop & Roberts, 1983; Gray & Shadbegian, 2003).
To determine the appropriateness of first-stage variables, we conducted several tests of
instrument strength. First, each of these measures is highly correlated with lobbying breadth, and
much less so with the outcomes of interest. Second, F-tests based on ordinary least squares (OLS)

regression are well above the threshold suggested by Stock and Yogo (2001) to provide evidence of
validity. However, some argue that both robust and nonrobust F statistics may be high even when
instruments are weak; as such, we employed the Montiel-Pflueger test for weak instruments to ensure
that our strategy was appropriate as this test is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. A
rejected test suggests that instruments are strong (Olea & Pflueger, 2013; Pflueger & Wang, 2015).
Results of this test suggest that our variable selection strategy for the correction terms was based
upon strong, valid instruments. Finally, Hansen’s J-statistic following two-stage regression with
robust standard errors also suggests that our variable selection strategy was sound (Semadeni,
Withers, & Trevis Certo, 2014). More simply, the above tests all suggest that the first-stage
regressors were not correlated with the error and therefore that the models were valid.
Each of the first-stage models also included all control variables (i.e., the structural model)
from the second-stage model (Semadeni et al., 2014; Vella, 1998). Results of the first-stage
model are included in the Appendix. In alternative analysis, we included other possible variables
in varying combinations to predict lobbying breadth, such as a proxy for firm inflexibility (net
property plant and equipment), which is highly correlated with lobbying breadth and minimally
so with our outcome variables. All alternatives provide results similar to those presented below.
Analytical Approach
Our measure of government contracting is left-censored because not all firms receive
government contracts in a given year. Indeed, approximately 39 percent of our observations are
left-censored at zero. Utilizing OLS regression with a censored dependent variable yields biased
coefficient estimates, so we employed a Tobit specification to account for censoring (Greene,
2000). We employed a random effects model (with year and industry dummies) because Tobit
models for panel analysis are not defined for fixed effects. However, as a robustness check, we

conducted analysis forcing firm fixed-effects into the models. Results from this alternative
specification are analogous to those reported below. Industry dummies were created off the
sectors in which the firm lobbies as defined by CRP in an attempt to capture some of the
collective nature of political strategy (e.g., Olson, 1965).
Our analysis focusing on firm performance used a two-step Arellano-Bond dynamic panel
specification because the inclusion of lagged dependent variables may induce dynamic panel
bias. In each model, we followed suggestions by Roodman (2008) and included time dummies,
utilized orthogonal deviations to maximize sample size, and included the Windemeijer robust
standard error correction. With the exception of the two selections corrections discussed above,
all variables were included in the instrument matrix. This dynamic panel specification is
especially suited to analyzing autoregressive-distributed lag models from panels with crosssectional units observed for relatively few time periods. The Arellano and Bond estimator
proceeds by transforming regressors through first-differencing and using the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) (Hansen, 1982) in its estimation (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano &
Bover, 1995; Greene, 2000).
This dynamic panel approach provides several advantages. First, prior dependent variable
values are controlled for, which is important in our analyses since firm performance in a given
year is likely related to prior years’ firm performance. Second, the Arellano-Bond approach uses
instrumental variables to remove unobserved latent heterogeneity, which may be problematic
when a lagged dependent variable is included due to the possibility of its being correlated with
the error term (Greene, 2000; Kennedy, 2008). Third, GMM estimation with robust standard
errors provides better estimates in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity that are
common in dynamic panels (Arellano, 2003). Finally, since independent variables become

potentially endogenous because they may be serially correlated to the error terms across time if
they are not strictly exogenous, the Arellano-Bond method uses lagged first-differenced values
of regressors as instruments to effectively deal with potential endogeneity.
Arellano-Bond tests were performed for autocorrelation and Hansen tests for the validity of
the instrumentation strategy. In all models of our hypothesized relationships, these tests
demonstrate no autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors and that our instrumentation is
valid, thus making us confident about the validity of our results, the treatment of potential
endogeneity, and the sufficiency of the use of the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano, 2003).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and correlations appear in Table 1. While we control for industry
lobbying variables, the correlations of our independent variables with these controls are rather
low, the highest being .12. Similarly, the correlation between firm lobbying and industry
lobbying is also relatively low at .13. These correlations suggest that firm lobbying strategy is
somewhat distinct from broader industry lobbying.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
-------------------------------------------Parameter estimates for government contracts are presented in Table 2 and firm performance
in Table 3. The first models in each table include only the control variables; the second models in
each table provide results for linear effects of lobbying breadth. Hypotheses 1 and 2 state that
firm lobbying breadth will have a positive relationship with government contracts and firm
performance, respectively, and become less pronounced at higher levels of lobbying breadth. To
test these hypotheses, we included the squared term of our lobbying breadth variable in Models 3
and 9. The results provide support for both hypotheses, with Models 3 and 9 suggesting a

significant positive linear coefficient (p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively) as well as a
significant negative squared term (p < 0.001 and p < 0.01, respectively). Additionally, the
cumulative measurements also provide support in Models 5 (p < 0.01 for linear term; p < 0.001
for squared term) and 11 (p < 0.001 for linear term; p < 0.01 for squared term). These cumulative
relationships are graphically represented in Figures 1 (Government Contracting) and 2 (Firm
Performance). The figures illustrate that firm outcomes increase initially as lobbying breadth
increases, but the increase slows as lobbying breadth becomes increasingly large. In additional
analyses, to guard against the possibility that influential values affected our results, we
winsorized our lobbying breadth variable and find consistent results. When considering the
effects of cumulative lobbying breadth on government contracts, for the average firm at half a
standard deviation below the mean, government contracts increase by 5.7 percent while above
the mean the increase is less at 4.4 percent. Considering firm performance, for the average firm
at half a standard deviation below the mean, performance increase by 8.2 percent for the average
firm while above the mean the increase is 7.2 percent. These results indicate the diminishingly
positive benefit of lobbying breadth at very high levels.
--------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figures 1 & 2 and Tables 2 & 3 about here
--------------------------------------------------------------Results for tests of Hypotheses 3 and 4 are presented in Models 3 and 9. We do not find
support for Hypothesis 3 in Model 3 (p > 0.10). However, results are supportive of Hypothesis 4
across Models 8 (p < .01) and 9 (p < .01). Moreover, these results are echoed in Model 11,
where political connectedness is measured cumulatively. These results suggest that as there are
greater levels of connectedness between the firm and government, firm performance increases.

We also tested the possibility that there is a diminishing effect for political connectedness
similar to that argued in Hypotheses 1 and 2. Results for this alternative analysis are not
supportive in either government contracts or firm performance. While the diminishing effect of
political connectedness is plausible, we believe that it is theoretically more difficult to assume
that a firm’s ability to influence the government becomes less valuable at any level. That is,
unlike lobbying breadth, which captures the dispersion in resources expended, political
connectedness is akin to expenditures in that it captures the amount of resources a firm has in the
form of political connectedness, not their dispersion across possible connectedness. The nature of
political connectedness is important for multiple reasons. First, a single possible relationship may
have a wide number of possible contacts within government. For example, a member of a firms’
board of directors who previously worked in government may have any number of contacts
within government to lever on behalf of his firm. Each of these may benefit the firm in some
material way such that greater political connectedness provides greater connectedness and as
such, greater potential benefits in return. Second, the U.S. government spends trillions a year;
even a fraction of a percent increase in contracts awarded to a firm nets large amounts. With such
spending, any additional connection is likely to prove valuable. Therefore, all things constant,
more resources (i.e., political connectedness) should have a continuous positive relationship.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest that at high levels of both lobbying breadth and political
connectedness, government contracting (H5) and firm performance (H6) will incur more
diminishing returns. To test these curvilinear interactions, we included product terms of political
connectedness with both the linear and squared lobbying breadth terms (Cohen, Cohen, West, &
Aiken, 1983). We focused on the squared terms in testing moderation to assist in avoiding
misinterpretation of correlated variables due to linearity or additivity in line with similar

investigations of curvilinear interactions (e.g., Cortina, 1993; George, 2005; Ridge, Aime, &
White, 2014). Hypothesis 5 finds support in Model 4 (p < 0.01), and Hypothesis 6 finds support
in Model 10 (p < 0.01). Similarly, cumulative measurements provide analogous results in
Models 6 and 12, respectively. These cumulative results are graphically represented in Figures 3
and 4 (with high and low values plotted at plus or minus 2 standard deviations), which show that
the diminishing relationship is more pronounced at high levels of connectedness, making the
benefits obtained through connectedness converge with higher levels of lobbying breadth.
-------------------------------------------Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here
-------------------------------------------The results of our cumulative analyses indicate that for firms with high political
connectedness, there is a 4 percent increase in government contracting at half a standard
deviation below the mean and a 3 percent increase above the mean. However, overall outcomes
are higher than for firms with lower connectedness. For firms with low political connectedness,
the increase is 8.9 percent below the mean and 6.9 percent increase above the mean. Similarly,
for the average firm with high political connectedness, overall there is a 6.2 percent increase in
Tobin’s Q at half a standard deviation below the mean and a 5.5 percent increase above the
mean. For firms with low political connectedness, the increase is 11.7 percent below the mean
and 9.9 percent above the mean. It is important to note, however, that while those firms that have
higher political connectedness have a slower increase in the value of government contracts as
lobbying breadth increases, they begin at higher levels, ultimately achieving similar outcomes to
those with low political connectedness at very high levels of lobbying breadth. This suggests that
for those firms with few political connections, greater levels of lobbying breadth are most
beneficial. As a robustness test, it may be argued that lobbying Congress and legislation is

redundant (i.e., Congress makes legislation, so counting the houses of Congress as independent
entities while also counting legislation is redundant). Thus we calculated lobbying breadth only
counting Congress in the breadth variable if a firm did not lobby legislation. Results of this
alternative analysis are similar in substance to those reported above.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we build upon the view that lobbying is a quintessential aspect of firms’ CPA
and extend our understanding of how lobbying influences the benefits received by the firm. Our
research moves beyond the dominant focus on how the total amount of firm expenditures
directed toward lobbying relates to the benefits received by firms in the form of firm
performance. Specifically, we not only begin to help clarify the inconsistent results in extant
research by addressing how firms’ performance is benefitted by considering more nuanced
aspects of lobbying, but we also extend our understanding to a more directly visible benefit of
lobbying, firm contracts. To gain insight into how resource allocation via lobbying breadth and
influence via political connectedness impacts firm outcomes in the form of government contracts
and firm performance, we developed and empirically tested a more comprehensive view of
lobbying strategy. Overall, we argue and find support in the context of S&P 500 firms that while
“spreading bets” across a greater number of entities can return benefits for firms, lobbying
breadth may suffer diminishing returns as it increases. Further, we generally find support for our
arguments that political connectedness both returns benefits for firms and moderates the
relationship between lobbying breadth and firm-level outcomes such that as lobbying breadth
increases, the benefit of political connectedness begins to diminish. Cumulatively, we advance
our understanding of lobbying and offer a number of contributions to theory and practice.

First, we extend current conceptualization of lobbying by introducing the concept of
lobbying breadth as a distinct dimension of lobbying strategy. In so doing, we move beyond the
relatively narrow focus on lobbying expenditures in previous research, helping to clarify
conflictive empirical results. Specifically, we theoretically develop the concept of lobbying
breadth and empirically demonstrate the effect that spreading influence across entities may have
on firm outcomes received. Further, as firms attempt to influence a greater breadth of
government, a tipping point occurs where the gains garnered tapers off at higher levels. These
findings suggest that more is not always better: not only does the breadth of how those
expenditures are targeted matter, there also comes a point at which lobbying is spread too thin.
Second, our development of lobbying breadth contributes to an understanding of how
resource allocation can influence firm outcomes. We find that while the breadth of resource
allocation improves benefits generally, these benefits diminish as breadth increases. To date, the
impact of resource allocation strategies has been examined for a variety of phenomena, such as
organizational innovation (Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014) and investment capital (Arrfelt et al.,
2015). We leverage the idea that firms can expand their ‘portfolio’ (Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014;
Stein, 1997) of resource allocation to return benefits but that at some point, the returns diminish
as the portfolio is spread increasingly thin. Thus, we extend our theoretical understanding of
resource allocation generally by suggesting a curvilinear relationship while also expanding
resource allocation arguments to the context of lobbying. Such findings are also important to
practice, as firms can balance the benefits associated with increasing resource allocation breadth
by not spreading such allocations too thin.
Third, our development of political connectedness is important in advancing theoretical
explanations of how similar expenditures can generate different returns based upon differences in

political connectedness. We find that as political connectedness increases, the benefits accrued to
firms in the form of government contracts and firm performance increase as well. Thus, to
understand the performance returns stemming from lobbying efforts, we must consider the
ability to influence decision makers via political connectedness. Moreover, while research shows
that relationships within the government collectively improve firm outcomes (Faccio, 2006;
Fisman, 2001; Nownes, 2006), few if any studies examine the types of political connectivity
collectively. Therefore, we extend discussions in the political connectedness literature by
showcasing how multiple types of connections can be used collectively to gain influence to
positively impact firm performance. Beyond the theoretical relevance of this research, our
findings offer practicing managers insight into means by which they can garner influence in the
political arena. Specifically, we show that the totality of connectedness with government can be
beneficial to firms, implying that firms may benefit by securing such connectedness.
Relatedly, we note the importance of the interplay between lobbying breadth and political
connectedness, thus extending our understanding of how firms can lever lobbying strategies –
not just aggregate expenditures – to fuel positive firm outcomes. We find that as lobbying
breadth increases, the benefit of the connectedness begins to diminish and thus is less beneficial.
Therefore, we develop our understanding of how multiple aspects of lobbying strategy work in
concert, an important extension to prior views of lobbying. Beyond the theoretical knowledge
gained, understanding how to better lever lobbying is particularly important to firms, given how
they are embedded in political environments that impact their performance (Hillman et al., 2004;
Lux et al., 2011). Thus, looking at how aspects of lobbying work in concert offers practical
insights with respect to determining ways in which to expend lobbying resources. At the same
time, to develop an understanding of the roles that lobbying breadth and political connectedness

play in determining payoffs firms receive from lobbying, we build upon previous work to
introduce novel measures of these constructs. Our development of measures of lobbying breadth
and political connectedness offers an empirical contribution in that it enables empirical testing of
mechanisms underlying aspects within firms’ political strategies.
Finally, we address calls to expand investigations of lobbying beyond firm performance
outcomes (Kim, 2008; Lux et al., 2011) to examine more directly observable firm outcomes like
government contracting. We do so by empirically demonstrating that lobbying impacts both
directly visible firm benefits (government contracts) as well as benefits that might accrue from
less directly observable but nonetheless beneficial outcomes that translate to higher firm
performance. This expansion is important, as most studies focus on performance outcomes that
result from various benefits that are difficult to observe directly (Lux et al., 2011).
Limitations and Future Directions
As with any study, there are limitations in our research that not only must be considered in
the context of our findings but that open up avenues for future research as well. One limitation
that is frequent in studies focusing on firm political strategy is the availability of data. In this
study, we chose to focus on government contracts and firm performance because each of these
variables is available and consistent across industries, allowing for greater generalizability of our
findings. However, while we provide robust evidence for our theorizing, limited access to largescale data on regulatory and legislative actions precluded theorizing and testing more nuanced
aspects of the policy process. Future research may benefit from doing a more industry-,
regulation-, or legislation-specific study of our theorizing as that data may be more available.
Another limitation is that while this paper focuses on the breadth of targeting as well as
political connectedness and their interplay, there may be other interactive effects that can add

additional nuance to our understanding of lobbying, such as particular lobbyists being more
effective in garnering specific returns like government contracts or defeating of bills (cf.
Nownes, 2006). Thus, future research might be well served by investigating contextual aspects of
lobbying strategy. One such potential interactive effect that seems worthy of investigation would
be to extend this research outside the confines of the U.S. The U.S. political system offers more
transparency than many others (Djankov et al., 2009). Still, aspects of the political environment
that are idiosyncratic either to the U.S., democratic forms of government, or developed
economies may affect how the lobbying process unfolds. Future research could address such
factors. While we expect that the mechanisms relating lobbying breadth and connectedness will
operate similarly across developed nations and democratic governmental contexts, there may be
important differences that would affect how the relationships unfold.
This study created and empirically examined a framework highlighting the importance of
aspects of lobbying other than total expenditures. Within this framework of lobbying breadth
and, to a lesser extent, political connectedness, there is much opportunity for future research to
further develop and examine these dimensions, helping to gain a better understanding of when
the tipping point occurs. It is plausible that this might differ by industries, executive teams, or
shifts in political power, among many other factors. Further research may also begin to unpack
whether firms benefit more from in-house or contracted lobbying. Even more detailed research
may investigate that impact of contracting rather than in-house lobbying depending upon the
type of action that is being lobbied within the government. Such research may provide insight
into certain contexts in which lobbying breadth may meet a less pronounced diminution of
impact. Indeed, it is certainly possible that in-house lobbyists provide a greater level of general
lobbying expertise, while contracted lobbyists may specialize in certain areas. If this is the case,

then in-house lobbyists may not be as susceptible to diminution of impact when attempting
influence over a greater breadth of government action.
CONCLUSION
This research sought to go beyond the focus on lobbying expenditures prevalent in the extant
literature to gain more understanding of dimensions of firms’ lobbying and how they drive
positive outcomes. We thus questioned how firms can successfully influence and impact
government entities through lobbying. To address this question, we levered literatures on
resource allocation and political connections, finding that outcomes stemming from lobbying are
influenced by the breadth of targeting of government entities and the connectedness of the firm.
Specifically, we find that in the case of lobbying breadth, there is a point where more targeting
will lead to diminishing firm contracts and performance. We also find that as lobbying breadth
increases, the benefits of political connectedness begin to diminish.

Appendix: First Stage Regression Results

Constant
Industry Tax Rate
Industry Lobbying
Industry Lobbying Intensity
Industry Attention
Regulated Industry
Tobin's Q
Firm Size
Financial Slack
Capital Expenditures
Long-term Debt
ROE
PAC Contributions
527 Contributions
Lobbying Expenditures
Income Taxes
Cost of Goods Sold
Observations
χ2

σμα
-8.29***
(0.65)
7.09***
(1.26)
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.14
(0.08)
0.13***
(0.03)
0.06
(0.15)
0.04
(0.03)
0.35***
(0.06)
-0.11**
(0.04)
0.46
(0.31)
0.24***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.09***
(0.01)
1.05***
(0.24)
0.07*
(0.03)
2180
1100.16***

σην
-5.26***
(0.71)
-1.63
(1.56)
0.00
(0.03)
0.05
(0.09)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.05
(0.15)
0.04
(0.03)
0.34***
(0.06)
-0.10**
(0.04)
0.24
(0.30)
0.22***
(0.03)
0.00
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.09***
(0.01)
1.05***
(0.24)
0.07*
(0.03)
2180
1216.41***

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; time dummies
included in second model.

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Mean
Lobbying Breadth
0.14
Depth of Connections
0.09
Tobin's Q
1.62
Prior Tobin's Q
1.70
Government Contracts a
1.20
Prior Contracts
10 .11
Static Correction
0.45
Dependence Correction
0.44
PAC Contributions a
6.91
a
527 Contributions
2.83
Lobbying Expenditures a
9.86
a
Firm Size
9.37
Slack d
0.44
d
Capital Expenditures
0.11
Long-term Debt d
0.65
ROE
0.23
Regulated Industry
0.38
c
Industry Attention
9.57
Industry Lobbying Intensity c
2.71
b
Industry Lobbying Expenditures
3.73
Industry Tax Rate
0.33
d
Income Taxes
0.06
Cost of Goods Sold d
1.20

S.D.
1.78
2.64
1.19
1.32
8.32
8.28
1.29
1.24
5.72
4.67
6.25
1.37
2.06
0.23
2.42
3.19
0.49
4.81
1.70
2.15
0.03
0.18
2.54

Correlations above |.04| are significant at the .05 level.
a Logarithm
b Scaled by 100000
c Scaled by 100
d Scaled by 10000

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

.55
-.20
-.19
.28
.30
.43
.48
.57
.43
.59
.60
.26
.44
.39
.00
.07
.09
.05
.12
-.07
.37
.41

-.15
-.14
.25
.25
.06
.12
.51
.40
.44
.45
.14
.26
.29
-.02
.09
.10
.06
.08
-.05
.13
.14

.85
-.11
-.12
.14
.16
-.30
-.15
-.24
-.50
-.13
-.15
-.17
.00
-.31
.17
.21
-.29
.07
-.05
-.18

-.10
-.12
.14
.16
-.28
-.14
-.23
-.49
-.12
-.15
-.17
.00
-.32
.21
.23
-.30
.10
-.04
-.18

.93
-.03
.00
.30
.16
.29
.20
.06
.12
.13
.03
-.03
.14
.15
-.07
-.07
.10
.20

-.02
.00
.30
.16
.30
.21
.06
.13
.13
.03
-.03
.15
.16
-.06
-.07
.10
.20

.97
-.16
-.06
-.16
-.25
-.13
-.17
-.18
.01
-.05
-.14
-.07
-.14
-.02
-.10
-.19

-.13
-.02
-.12
-.20
-.10
-.14
-.15
.00
-.04
-.02
.02
-.13
.05
-.07
-.16

.49
.72
.59
.16
.29
.21
.01
.14
-.08
-.13
.15
-.03
.21
.29

.41
.43
.08
.34
.18
-.01
.07
.00
-.04
.13
.02
.26
.30

.55
.15
.25
.19
.01
.09
.05
.01
.13
-.06
.20
.25

.45
.51
.49
.00
.29
-.04
-.14
.34
-.08
.38
.50

.15
.75
-.01
.11
-.01
-.03
.08
-.03
.12
.26

.42
.00
.13
-.05
-.10
.15
-.08
.65
.67

.00
.11
-.02
-.05
.10
-.09
.15
.34

-.03
-.03
-.02
-.02
.02
.00
.00

-.25
-.35
.42
-.19
-.01
-.04

.93
-.02
-.08
.00
-.07

-.26
-.07 -.17
-.03 .11 .05
-.10 .12 .00 .67

TABLE 2
Government Contracts
Constant
Industry Lobbying
Industry Lobbying Attention
Industry Lobbying Intensity
Industry Tax Rate
Regulated Industry
Tobin’s Q
Prior Contracts
Firm Size
Financial Slack
Capital Expenditures
Long-term Debt
ROE
σμα
σην
PAC Contributions
527 Contributions
Lobbying Expenditures

(1)
-8.52
(5.09)
- 0.21
(0.15)
0.29
(0.21)
- 0.39
(0.61)
-5.35
(7.57)
0.41
(1.82)
0.44**
(0.17)
0.12***
(0.03)
1.57***
(0.39)
0.03
(0.21)
0.44
(1.33)
0.12
(0.16)
0.01
(0.03)
1.22
(0.80)
-1.36
(0.80)
0.11*
(0.06)
0.01
(0.04)
0.03
(0.04)

Predictors
Lobbying Breadth

(2)
-6.26
(5.43)
- 0.21
(0.15)
0.27
(0.21)
- 0.39
(0.61)
-4.47
(7.62)
0.44
(1.83)
0.44*
(0.17)
0.12***
(0.03)
1.39***
(0.42)
0.03
(0.21)
- .01
(1.38)
0.06
(0.17)
0.01
(0.03)
1.31
(0.80)
-1.84*
(0.89)
0.09
(0.06)
0.00
(0.04)
0.01
(0.04)

(3)
-5.04
(5.53)
- 0.22
(0.15)
0.23
(0.21)
- 0.29
(0.61)
-4.72
(7.60)
0.46
(1.86)
0.45**
(0.17)
0.12***
(0.03)
1.33**
(0.42)
0.00
(0.21)
0.00
(1.38)
0.14
(0.17)
0.01
(0.03)
1.29
(0.80)
-1.84*
(0.89)
0.08
(0.06)
- 0.00
(0.04)
- 0.02
(0.04)

(4)
-5.33
(5.49)
- 0.22
(0.15)
0.24
(0.21)
- 0.30
(0.61)
-2.92
(7.64)
0.44
(1.84)
0.45**
(0.17)
0.12***
(0.03)
1.32**
(0.42)
0.05
(0.21)
0.70
(1.41)
0.07
(0.18)
0.01
(0.03)
1.45
(0.80)
-1.89*
(0.89)
0.07
(0.06)
- 0.01
(0.04)
- 0.03
(0.04)

(5)a
-5.44
(4.61)
- 0.20
(0.14)
0.22
(0.21)
- 0.27
(0.59)
-4.51
(7.52)
0.21
(1.54)
0.47**
(0.17)
0.11***
(0.03)
1.29***
(0.38)
0.02
(0.19)
- .00
(1.33)
0.23
(0.16)
0.01
(0.03)
1.36
(0.79)
-1.59
(0.82)
0.09
(0.06)
0.00
(0.04)
- 0.00
(0.04)

(6)a
-5.39
(4.66)
- 0.20
(0.14)
0.20
(0.21)
- 0.23
(0.59)
-3.19
(7.58)
0.21
(1.54)
0.46**
(0.17)
0.11***
(0.03)
1.26***
(0.38)
0.06
(0.20)
0.71
(1.36)
0.15
(0.18)
0.01
(0.03)
1.41
(0.79)
-1.60
(0.82)
0.08
(0.06)
0.00
(0.04)
- 0.01
(0.04)

0.42
(0.34)

0.04
(0.10)

0.86**
(0.37)
- 0.06***
(0.02)
0.03
(0.10)

0.60**
(0.30)
- 0.08***
(0.03)
0.10
(0.11)

2180
146.21***

2180
150.69***

0.87**
(0.38)
- 0.07***
(0.03)
0.15
(0.13)
- 0.10**
(0.05)
0.01**
(0.01)
2180
157.81***

0.69**
(0.31)
- 0.10***
(0.03)
0.20
(0.14)
- 0.10*
(0.06)
0.01**
(0.01)
2144
196.16***

Lobbying Breadth2
Political Connectedness
Lobbying Breadth * Connectedness
Lobbying Breadth2 * Connectedness
Observations
χ2

2180
146.92***

2144
197.58***

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; t-tests are two tailed for controls and one tailed for
hypothesized variables; Year and Industry dummies included in all models.
a Predictors measured cumulatively across time t and t – 1 in this model.

TABLE 3
Firm Performance
Constant
Industry Lobbying
Industry Lobbying Attention
Industry Lobbying Intensity
Industry Tax Rate
Regulated Industry
Tobin’s Q
Firm Size
Financial Slack
Capital Expenditures
Long-term Debt
ROE
σμα
σην
PAC Contributions
527 Contributions
Lobbying Expenditures

(7)
1.97*
(0.99)
- 0.05*
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
- 0.17*
(0.08)
3.62**
(1.24)
- 0.11
(0.12)
0.41***
(0.05)
- 0.28**
(0.09)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.53**
(0.18)
- 0.01
(0.01)
- 0.01
(0.00)
0.34
(0.18)
- 0.27
(0.19)
- 0.01
(0.01)
- 0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)

Predictors
Lobbying Breadth

(8)
2.29*
(0.97)
- 0.03
(0.03)
0.06*
(0.03)
- 0.16*
(0.08)
3.73**
(1.38)
- 0.07
(0.13)
0.49***
(0.06)
- 0.25**
(0.09)
0.07***
(0.02)
0.31*
(0.15)
- 0.05**
(0.02)
- 0.00
(0.00)
0.38*
(0.18)
- 0.48*
(0.19)
- 0.04***
(0.01)
- 0.01
(0.01)
- 0.00
(0.01)

(9)
2.50*
(0.98)
- 0.03
(0.03)
0.05
(0.03)
- 0.15*
(0.07)
3.73**
(1.37)
- 0.06
(0.12)
0.49***
(0.06)
- 0.25**
(0.09)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.34*
(0.15)
- 0.04*
(0.02)
- 0.00
(0.00)
0.38*
(0.18)
- 0.47*
(0.19)
- 0.04***
(0.01)
- 0.01*
(0.01)
- 0.01
(0.01)

(10)
2.11*
(0.97)
- 0.03
(0.02)
0.06
(0.03)
- 0.15*
(0.07)
3.75**
(1.34)
- 0.07
(0.11)
0.50***
(0.06)
- 0.24**
(0.09)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.32*
(0.14)
- 0.04*
(0.02)
- 0.00
(0.00)
0.41*
(0.19)
- 0.50*
(0.20)
- 0.04***
(0.01)
- 0.01
(0.01)
- 0.01
(0.01)

(11)a
1.69*
(0.84)
- 0.03
(0.03)
0.06*
(0.03)
- 0.17*
(0.07)
3.85**
(1.35)
- 0.08
(0.11)
0.50***
(0.06)
- 0.21**
(0.08)
0.05**
(0.02)
0.36**
(0.13)
- 0.03*
(0.01)
- 0.00
(0.00)
0.42*
(0.19)
- 0.45*
(0.19)
- 0.03**
(0.01)
- 0.01
(0.01)
- 0.01
(0.01)

(12)a
1.79*
(0.91)
- 0.03
(0.02)
0.05
(0.03)
- 0.14*
(0.07)
3.68**
(1.31)
- 0.08
(0.11)
0.51***
(0.06)
- 0.21**
(0.08)
0.05**
(0.02)
0.34*
(0.13)
- 0.03
(0.02)
- 0.00
(0.00)
0.40*
(0.19)
- 0.44*
(0.19)
- 0.03**
(0.01)
- 0.01
(0.01)
- 0.01
(0.01)

0.14**
(0.06)
0.04**
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.07)
- 0.01**
(0.00)
0.04**
(0.02)

0.15***
(0.06)
- 0.01**
(0.01)
0.04*
(0.02)

918.93***
1.11
369.55

974.85***
1.11
371.26

0.19***
(0.06)
- 0.01**
(0.00)
0.05**
(0.02)
- 0.02*
(0.01)
0.00**
(0.00)
993.89***
1.12
369.89

0.17***
(0.06)
- 0.01**
(0.01)
0.05**
(0.02)
- 0.02
(0.01)
0.00*
(0.00)
903.30***
1.30
362.84

Lobbying Breadth2
Political Connectedness
Lobbying Breadth * Connectedness
Lobbying Breadth2 * Connectedness
χ2
AR(2)
Hansen J

718.56***
0.87
353.58

814.21***
1.28
364.63

n = 2,162; Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; t-tests are two tailed for controls and one
tailed for hypothesized variables; Year and Industry dummies included in all models.
a Predictors measured cumulatively across time t and t – 1 in this model.

FIGURE 1
Lobbying Breadth and Government Contracting

FIGURE 2
Lobbying Breadth and Firm Performance

FIGURE 3
Interaction of Lobbying Breadth and Political Connectedness
on Government Contracting

FIGURE 4
Interaction of Lobbying Breadth and Political Connectedness on Firm Performance
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